Seals and the Need for more Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators by Häberli, Christian
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463680 
 
July 8, 2014 
 
Published by the Society of International 
Economic Law  
 
with the support of the University of Missouri-
Kansas City (UMKC) School of Law 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge 
from:  
http://ssrn.com/link/SIEL-2014-Bern-
Conference.html 
 
 
 
 
Online Proceedings 
Working Paper No. 2014/22 
    
 
FOURTH BIENNIAL GLOBAL CONFERENCE   
JULY 10 - 12, 2014  
WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE 
UNIVERSITY OF BERN 
 
 
SEALS AND THE NEED FOR MORE DEFERENCE TO VIENNA 
BY WTO ADJUDICATORS 
 
CHRISTIAN HÄBERLI, PH.D.,  
SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, NCCR TRADE REGULATION  
WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE (WTI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.
or
g/
10
.7
89
2/
bo
ri
s.
63
05
5 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
13
.3
.2
01
7
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463680 
SIEL CONFERENCE 2014 Regulatory Challenges in International Economic Law: 
Convergence or Divergence? 
Paper submitted to PANEL XII: Signed, Sealed and Delivered: Fragmentation or 
Coherence Between PIL and IEL after EC – Seals and other Recent WTO Cases 
Christian Häberli is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Centre of Competence in 
Research – Trade Regulation, World Trade Institute, Bern University (Switzerland) 
(http://www.nccr-trade.org/people/haeberli/). Comments by September 2014 welcome to 
christian.haeberli[at]wti.org. 
Research for this article was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under a grant 
to the National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade Regulation, based at the Univer-
sity of Bern’s World Trade Institute in Bern, Switzerland. 
SEALS AND THE NEED FOR MORE DEFERENCE TO 
VIENNA BY WTO ADJUDICATORS 
Christian Häberli 
Executive Summary 
This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the 
Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account 
when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law 
(IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by 
the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 
At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary 
means of treaty interpretation.1 Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO 
adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) 
prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmat-
ic way out of interpretation quandaries. 
The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so 
to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to 
buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, 
however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention 
of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards address-
ing indigenous rights and animal welfare.2 
In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, 
this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL 
just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the 
credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the 
                                                 
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331(1980); also in 8 
International Legal Materials 679. The VCLT was adopted on 22 May 1969. 
2 The Panel Reports list VCLT but do not ever refer to the Convention (WT/DS400/R 
and WT/DS401/R, p.11). 
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adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases 
when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensu-
rate with the challenges of globalisation.  
This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic 
trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as 
these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels 
and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent 
international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges 
which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their 
job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence 
could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the 
credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading 
system per se. 
I. Introduction 
Policy-makers and preamble texts in WTO agreements frequently claim 
mutual supportiveness of IEL and PIL.3 Similarly, AB exhortations to 
adopt a holistic approach guided by Article 31 VCLT seem necessarily to 
imply PIL consideration for all ‘trade and…’ matters. This is particularly 
important also because the WTO has one of the few dispute settlement 
systems with the constitutional power to go beyond conciliation.4 
For disputes about sanitary and phytosanitary measures the by now 
well-established recourse to scientific standards as laid down in IEL 
bodies, especially the ‘three sisters’ Codex alimentarius, Office Interna-
tional des Epizooties (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Conven-
tion (IPPC) have helped WTO to avoid becoming a ‘science court.’5 As for 
                                                 
3 Some such statements, even when crafted with the help of the WTO Secretariat, look 
more naïve than political: ‘Effective MEAs help to prevent disputes from arising in the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system, and thus provide an important source of mutual 
supportiveness for the trading system.’ UNEP, Enhancing Synergies and Mutual 
Supportiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade 
Organization. Synthesis Report, January 2002, p.16. 
4 Georges Abi Saab, The Interaction Between Diplomatic and Judicial Means in 
Theoretical Perspective. in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo G. Kohen, and 
Jorge E. Viñuales (Eds), Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement. Brill & 
Nijhoff (2012), p.330. 
5 The implementation of EC – Biotech still pending before the DSB, and the, well, 
‘pragmatic’ solution found in EC – Hormones seem to show a limit to purely ‘science-
based’ trade disputes. 
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other matters it has been argued that real conflicts between trade measures 
implementing multiple objectives including human rights, environmental 
or animal welfare norms have been rare.6 According to this view, WTO is 
not and need not become a public morals court or a place for adjudicating 
claims of violations of human rights or environmental norms. Things may 
be changing though. 
For example, before EC – Seals the only two WTO rulings on public 
morals claims were those in US – Gambling and in China – Audiovisuals.7 
In all three cases public morals have been accepted as a possible exception 
to GATT rules. Yet the actual implementation measures taken were found 
to unduly discriminate against third country suppliers. This seems to 
increasingly contradict legal doctrine (and wishful thinking of politicians) 
on the available avenues to consistent rule-making and to coherence 
between PIL and IEL. 
WTO adjudicators have no easy task. They are to assist the Dispute Set-
tlement Body (DSB) in the interpretation of WTO provisions. The automa-
ticity of dispute settlement is essential to the ‘security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system’ as it serves to ‘clarify the existing provi-
sions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpre-
tation of public international law’ (Art.3.2 DSU).8 However, the exclusive 
authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreements lies not with the 
DSB but with the Ministerial Conference and the General Council (Article 
IX:2 WTO Agreement). For good measure the DSU insists that neither 
panels nor the AB can add to or diminish any WTO rights or obligations 
(Art.19.2 DSU). Despite this very clear limitation some common law 
lawyers take a pragmatic approach and consider the AB as an international 
customary law-maker mandated to fill the gaps and to clarify ambiguities 
left open by negotiators. Guzman and Meyer even argue that ‘regardless of 
whether an ambiguous textual basis for a tribunal’s ruling exists, in both 
cases a court is crafting an obligation not explicitly defined by the text of 
                                                 
6 Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights. in F. M. Abbott, 
Ch. Breining-Kaufmann, and T. Cottier (eds.), International Trade and Human Rights: 
Foundations and Conceptual Issues (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 204. 
7 Panagiotis Delimatsis, Protecting Public Morals in a Digital Age: Revisiting the 
WTO Rulings on US-Gambling and China – Publiations and Audiovisual Products. 14(2) 
(2011) Journal of International Economic Law 257–293. 
8 Gabrielle Marceau and Jennifer A. Hamaoui, Implementation of Recommendations 
and Rulings in the WTO System. in Boisson de Chazournes et al. (op.cit. supra), p.192. 
4  Christian Häberli 
an agreement.’9 Whatever the practical implications of such a far-reaching 
liberty, rule-setting is not and cannot be allowed beyond the case at hand. 
Moreover, panels drawing on PIL to find appropriate guidance for the 
interpretation of WTO law tend to exercise more restraint than the AB as 
the ‘Supreme Court’ established by the DSU. 
In reality the task of rules’ interpretation is delegated to the panels de-
spite these limitations: their standard terms of reference are ‘to make such 
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in 
giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements’ cited by the 
parties to the dispute (Art.7.2 DSU). The appeal process and the AB’s 
mandate are ‘limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal 
interpretations developed by the panel’ (Art.17.6 DSU). An adjudicator’s 
life can therefore amount to a wild ride between Scylla and Charybdis, 
because on the one side ‘[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot 
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements’ (Art.3.2 DSU). On the other side ‘[t]he aim of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute’ (Art.3.7 
DSU). 
Litigation, arguably, is not an ideal place to determine policy space. 
When looking at divergent treaty and policy objectives, adjudicators will 
find reconciliation singularly constrained by their terms of reference. Does 
this mean that when the chips are down, mutual supportiveness will turn 
out to be a fiction? Can adjudicators start considering PIL only when a 
party refers to it? Does the notion of a member-driven rules framework 
oblige them to limit their ‘objective assessment of the facts of the case and 
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements’ 
(Art.11 DSU)? Or can they, at best, consider procedural IEL provisions 
when making their findings? With all the deference imposed by the DSU 
can adjudicators in any way restrain further PIL and IEL fragmentation? 
Our research hypothesis is that, without falling into the fatal trap of ju-
diciary activism, a better reading of the provisions of the VCLT (including 
Article 31.3(c)) by adjudicators is both necessary and possible. Doing so 
could produce greater convergence in an international environment charac-
terised by different legal orders, different standard setting bodies and 
divergent national regulations and implementing authorities. This is by no 
means an easy task. Abi Saab has pointed out the problem of advisory 
                                                 
9 Andrew T. Guzman and Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law. 2(1) (2010) 
Journal of Legal Analysis, Spring, pp.214-215. Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1385438424846 accessed 30 June 2014. 
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opinions as a potential source of ‘dissonance’ when adjudicators have a 
‘muddled understanding’ of their role.10 True, the problem starts with the 
splendid self-isolation of a corpus iuris specialis such as WTO law. Yet, 
trade diplomats may fail to see the bigger  picture and the complexity of 
policy-making by the governments they serve, both at the national level 
and in other international fora. This raises the question whether the sys-
temic limitations of WTO dispute settlement prevent the litigators and 
adjudicators in trade disputes from adopting the holistic treaty interpreta-
tion exercise prescribed by the AB pursuant to the customary rules as 
provided for in Article 31 VCLT.11 Add to this the fragmentation between 
PIL and IEL case law, not to mention political expediency at the national 
level, and you get a rather unflattering picture of international regulatory 
governance. 
In such a context it is perhaps preposterous to expect the last and weak-
est link in this chain to solve the problem created by incoherence at the 
national level and by trade policy-makers determined to keep non-traders 
and politicians at bay. Indeed, judges having to apply the law and to find a 
‘positive solution’ are statutorily deprived of the prerogative to add even 
one iota to the rules. As is well known such rules are at times adopted at 
five o’clock in the morning by stressed and tired negotiators. Adjudicators 
and their case law guardians in the WTO Secretariat may have cooler 
heads than negotiators. They often come from different backgrounds and 
disciplines, and they should have a learning capacity beyond that of the 
interest defenders in a negotiation about policy space. But where is their 
wiggle room? 
The assumption here is that a truly holistic and teleological treaty inter-
pretation would also facilitate osmosis between PIL and IEL and improve 
understanding and acceptance of WTO and of the merits of trade liberalisa-
tion other than in trade circles. At the same time, a clarification of what 
adjudicators can do to discipline unilateral protection of parochial interests 
could further buttress the WTO’s role as a bulwark against extra-territorial 
standard-setting in national legislation and regional trade deals. 
The focus here is on three research questions: 
1. To what extent can and do DSB rulings take Vienna other interna-
tional agreements and standards into account? 
                                                 
10 Georges Abi Saab, op.cit. supra p.332. 
11 AB Report EC – Chicken Cuts, para 176. AB Report US – Continued Zeroing, para 
268. 
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2. Might recent WTO dispute settlement outcomes such as EC – Seals 
exacerbate the segmentation of PIL and IEL and prevent the effective 
furtherance of societal values such as human rights, health and labour 
standards, environmental protection, animal welfare or consumer infor-
mation? 
3. Seen from within IEL, do Vienna-based rulings integrating PIL ele-
ments present a risk of ‘encroachment’ into the multilateral trading system, 
with a chilling effect on the negotiation of new trade rules? Or do they on 
the contrary facilitate acceptance of a ‘trade and…’ court and of future 
trade disciplines? 
The paper begins by visiting the present pattern of references to the 
VCLT in WTO litigation for purposes of rules’ interpretation. Building on 
this basis it analyses the three research questions. The conclusion is that 
(WTO) adjudicators should and could make better use of the small inter-
pretation margins they have, both for more coherence of and more defer-
ence to PIL; at the very least, every effort must be made to preserve 
national policy space with ‘no or at most minimal’ trade impact. 
II. Vienna and the DSU 
At first sight, the abundance of references to Vienna in Panel and AB 
reports is striking. Of its 85 Articles, no fewer than 15 are quoted more or 
less extensively in a rapidly increasing number of cases.12 For this enquiry 
it will be useful to start by recalling three general PIL principles and their 
absorption into WTO case law. We then look at the two main Articles 31 
and 32 VCLT, for general rules and for supplementary means of interpreta-
tion, before concluding this section with a somewhat sombre case sum-
mary. 
General PIL principles 
 Good faith is laid down in Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda). However, 
like in all international treaties, good faith by all WTO Members is pre-
sumed by default. In many disputes ‘bad faith’ is easily claimed, but 
there are no such rulings. In EC – Sardines the AB held that a panel 
could determine whether a Member has or has not acted in good faith, 
adding this qualifier: ‘Nothing, however, in the covered agreements 
                                                 
12 See WTO Analytical Index, Volume II (2013), p.1511. 
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supports the conclusion that simply because a WTO Member is found 
to have violated a substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not act-
ed in good faith. In our view, it would be necessary to prove more than 
mere violation to support such a conclusion.’13 In another reference to 
the VCLT the AB also clarified good faith as being the common inten-
tions of the parties – rather than the ‘legitimate expectations’ of one of 
the parties.14 
 Internal law is no excuse for non-fulfilment of a substantive or proce-
dural international obligation or concession. Article 27 lays down that 
‘[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justifica-
tion for its failure to perform a treaty.’ WTO adjudicators have clari-
fied that this also applies to legislative15 and judiciary organs.16 
 The WTO Agreements are drafted as authentic texts in three languages, 
presumed to have the same meaning (Art.33.3 VCLT). Plurilingual 
texts (i.e. with several authentic versions) can and must be compared 
for compatibility.17 In a similar vein the AB declared that while dic-
tionaries were a ‘useful starting point’ for the determination of the or-
dinary meaning of a treaty term, panels had to analyse each case ac-
cording to its particular circumstances ‘in the light of the intention of 
the parties as expressed in the words used by them against the light of 
the surrounding circumstances.’18 
In the remainder of this section we describe how WTO adjudicators take 
PIL into consideration by applying (a) general rules of interpretation and 
(b) supplementary means of interpretation i.e. under Articles 31 and 32 
VCLT, before returning to public morals and to the seals case. 
General Rules of Interpretation (Article 31 VCLT) 
Article 3.2 DSU prescribes that ‘customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law’ serve to clarify the provisions of the WTO 
agreements. Quoting several PIL cases and renowned scholars, the AB 
determined in its second ruling that these rules mean the general rules of 
                                                 
13 WT/DS231/AB/R, para 200. 
14 AB Report EC – Computer Equipment, paras 83-84 (emphasis in the original text). 
15 Panel Report Mexico – Telecoms, para 7.244. 
16 AB Report US – Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 – Japan), para 182. 
17 AB Report India – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), footnote 153. 
18 AB Report EC — Chicken Cuts, paras. 175-176. 
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interpretation contained in Article 31 VCLT, and confirmed that they have 
‘attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law’.19 
The main provision for this research is  Article 31.3 VCLT (emphasis 
added, and subsequently commented upon): 
‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.’ 
As for the meaning of shall be taken into account the Panel in EC – 
Biotech clarified that rules’ interpretation in the light of other treaties is 
not an option but an obligation, and that in cases with more than one 
permissible interpretation, the good faith principle would lead a panel to 
settle for the interpretation ‘more in accord with other applicable rules of 
international law’.20 
In EC – Bananas III the AB likened subsequent agreement to a multi-
lateral interpretation of a WTO provision by the General Council, accord-
ing to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement ‘or the application of its 
provisions pursuant to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention’.21 The 
Panel in US – Cloves followed this reasoning when it wrote that the legal 
interpretation of the Doha Ministerial Decision could be seen as (i) an 
authoritative interpretation under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, (ii) 
a subsequent agreement in the sense of Art.31.3(a) or (iii) a supplementary 
means of interpretation (Art.32).22 
As is well known, but often misunderstood by common law scholars, 
WTO jurisprudence as the evolving case law of the multilateral trading 
system ‘is not binding, except with respect to resolving a particular dispute 
between the parties.’23 Interestingly, the AB has declined to read here a 
reference to subsequent practice in a specific case, as in Art.31.1(b) 
VCLT.24 Similarly, Article 31.2 deals with the context for the purpose of 
                                                 
19 AB Report US – Gasoline, page 17). 
20 Panel Report EC – Biotech, paras 7.69-7.70. 
21 AB Report EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), para 383. 
22 Panel Report US – Clove Cigarettes, para 7.576. 
23 AB Report US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para 159, with reference to AB Report 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, page 14. 
24 AB Report Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, page 14. 
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treaty interpretation. Here the AB once again maintained that this does not 
include WTO jurisprudence: 
Panel reports in previous disputes do not form part of the context of a term or pro-
vision in the sense of Article 31(2). Rather, the legal interpretation embodied in 
adopted panel and Appellate Body reports become part and parcel of the WTO acquis 
and have to be taken into account as such.25 
What then are the relevant rules of international law for WTO adjudica-
tors? In US – Shrimp the AB referred to Art.31.3(c) when it sought ‘addi-
tional interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles 
of international law.’26 
The problem of course starts with the question of the applicability of 
rules agreed between only some of the WTO Members. One trade remedy 
panel said that Art.31.3(c) would not be relevant where ‘Argentina has not 
sought to rely on any law providing that, in respect of relations between 
Argentina and Brazil, the WTO agreements should be interpreted in a 
particular way’.27 Similarly, in US – Shrimp the AB noted that the United 
States, although a party to the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), ‘did not make any 
attempt to raise the issue of sea turtle mortality due to shrimp trawling in 
the CITES Standing Committee as a subject requiring concerted action by 
states.’28 But in EC – Biotech the Panel held that ‘the principle of precau-
tion is a "general principle of international law"’ and could thus could be 
‘considered a "rule of international law" within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(c).’29  
The same panel also referred to the VCLT when it clarified that the par-
ties means not ‘one or more parties’ or ‘parties to a dispute’ but the States 
which have consented to be bound by the treaty which is being interpreted 
                                                 
25 AB Report US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para 325. 
26 AB Report US – Shrimp, para 158 and footnote 157. 
27 Panel Report Argentina – Poultry Antidumping Duties, para 7.41 and footnote 64 
(emphasis in the original text). 
28 AB Report US – Shrimp, footnote 174. 
29 Panel Report EC – Biotech, para 7.67 (emphasis added). Isabelle Van Damme noted 
that the EC – Biotech Panel recognised that treaties and general principles of law could 
constitute ‘rules of international law’ thereby rejecting a defence brought by the United 
States when it ruled that it did have the discretion to consider such rules as ‘context’ to 
determine the ‘ordinary meaning’ under Article 31.1 VCLT. See Isabelle Van Damme, 
Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 
369. 
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and for which that treaty is in force (7.68).30 Eventually, however, that 
panel stopped its analysis, estimating that it ‘need not take a position on 
whether or not the precautionary principle is a recognized principle of 
general or customary international law’ (7.89). 
The biotech panel ruling was not appealed. But its reasoning was taken 
up by the AB in EC – Airbus where, again, the EU opposed the US view 
that ‘the parties’ mean ‘all the parties’ to the treaty being interpreted (para 
843). The AB held that ‘a delicate balance must be struck between, on the 
one hand, taking due account of an individual WTO Member's internation-
al obligations and, on the other hand, ensuring a consistent and harmonious 
approach to the interpretation of WTO law among all WTO Members’ 
(para 845). After reviewing the 1992 bilateral agreement between the 
parties, it nonetheless concluded that this agreement ‘is not a "relevant" 
rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, 
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, that 
informs the meaning of "benefit" under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agree-
ment’ (para 855). 
As for the ordinary meaning of terms used in the definitions provided in 
Annex A to the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), the EC – Biotech Panel relied 
on standard WTO jurisprudence when it argued that a panel may consider 
the ordinary meaning if it considers this to be informative even if not all 
parties are members: ‘It follows that when a treaty interpreter does not 
consider another rule of international law to be informative, he or she need 
not rely on it.’ This too the panel did not find to be necessary after it had 
considered the necessary materials for its interpretation obtained directly 
from the relevant international organisations (7.92–7.96). 
                                                 
30 In the often misread footnote 242 to that paragraph the Panel further explained why 
the words "all the parties" in Article 31.2(a) were absent in Article 31.3(c). In doing so it 
explicitly referred to the renowned PIL scholar Mustafa Yasseen (L'interprétation des Traités 
d'après la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités, in Recueil des Cours de l'Académie 
de Droit International (1976), Vol. III, p. 63, para. 7). Finally, the Panel also referred to 
Article 31.3(b) in order to explain why it nonetheless took the view that ‘the term "the 
parties" in Article 31(3)(c) should be understood as referring to all the parties to a treaty’: 
Article 31.3(b) ‘which is part of the immediate context of Article 31(3)(c), provides that a 
treaty interpreter must take into account "any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation".’ The 
finding on all the parties was thus a logical consquence of the subsequent practice rule in the 
VCLT: ‘In our view, it would be incongruous to allow the interpretation of a treaty to be 
affected by rules of international law which are not applicable in the relations between all 
parties to the treaty, but not by a subsequent practice which does not establish the agreement 
of all parties to the treaty regarding the meaning of that treaty.’ (FN 243 in fine) 
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Supplementary Means of Interpretation (Art.32 VCLT) 
Supplementary means of interpretation as defined in Article 32 VCLT 
have also attained the status of customary or general international law.31 
References by WTO adjudicators specifically to this article are much less 
frequent than those made to Article 31. 
In some cases the AB disagreed with the panel and saw an ‘appropriate, 
indeed necessary’ recourse to supplementary means as provided for in 
Article 32. Such recourse becomes necessary, for instance, where the 
Schedule language is not clear32 or if by applying Article 31 the meaning 
‘leads to a result manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.33 
Little more is found in the WTO Analytical Index where VCLT re-
course was made to PIL sources as a supplementary means of IEL interpre-
tation. A case in point where such an opportunity was perhaps missed is 
EC – Seals. 
Seals as a Missed Opportunity 
As mentioned above, not a single reference to VCLT is made in the 
seals case by either the Panel or the AB, despite frequent references to 
various international conventions throughout the proceedings. The main 
reference was to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples which affirms indigenous peoples' right to self-determination 
(Articles 3 and 4) and their control over resources.34 Another treaty with 
almost identical relevant wording is the ILO Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.35 Art.2.2(b) 
mandates governments to take into account and to protect the interests of 
indigenous peoples by ‘promoting the full realisation of the social, eco-
nomic and cultural rights of these peoples with respect to their social and 
cultural identity.’ The Guiding Principles for Animal Welfare established 
                                                 
31 AB Report Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p.10. Footnote 17 contains ample 
reference to academic PIL views as well as to a number of ICJ rulings in this matter.  
32 AB Reports Canada – Dairy, para 138, and US – Gambling, para 197 
33 AB Report EC – Computer Equipment, para 86. 
34 Resolution of the UN General Assembly A/RES/61/295 of 13 September 2007 
35 The ILO Convention 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) has a special 
website with numerous materials and resources, including information about ILO 
technical assistance related to Convention No. 169: www.ilo.org/indigenous accessed 4 
July 2014. It has been ratified by 22 mainly Latin American countries. In Europe, only 
Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Spain have ratified this Convention. Canada and 
the United States have not ratified it. 
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by the OIE was the third IEL standard repeatedly referred to in this case, 
and with basically the same arguments by the parties. In the panel and AB 
deliberations all three went through the same process, without a reference 
in the findings.36 
Canada rejected outright the relevance of these texts in the case at hand, 
because they ‘do not require the EU to introduce a measure that provides 
trade preferences for Inuit.’37  
Norway also argued that the PIL requirements did not conflict with 
those of the WTO covered agreements, because they did not prescribe 
discriminatory trade preferences. Further, the EU could ‘protect the rele-
vant interests of indigenous communities whilst also avoiding WTO-
inconsistent discrimination.’ In Norway’s view the EU could find a better 
way to improve the welfare of seals than with an exception for seals’ 
harvesting by its indigenous communities. Besides, a ‘panel may not look 
for objectives beyond the four corners of the WTO legal system.’38 
In respect of indigenous communities the Panel acknowledged that 
‘States are called on to "provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, 
and redress for … [a]ny action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing 
them of their … resources" (Article 8(2)(b)).’39 The Panel also quoted 
directly from the ILO Convention affirming ‘the "rights of [indigenous 
peoples] to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially 
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate 
in the use, management and conservation of these resources" (Article 
2(2)(b)).’40 The Panel then waded deep into moralities of different kinds, 
and it recognised the difference between commercial and traditional (Inuit) 
hunts. It thus rejected the complainants’ argument that the ban was ‘more 
trade-restrictive than necessary’ under TBT-Article 2.2. While recognising 
the public morals exception in principle, it also rejected the EU’s attempt 
                                                 
36 Office International des Epizooties (OIE), Guiding Principles for Animal Welfare 
(2004). The Panel also quotes from Chapter 7.1 of the OIE’s Terrestrial Animal Code 
whose 22nd edition incorporates the modifications to the Terrestrial Code agreed during 
the 81st General Session in May 2013. For a history of OIE’s codification of animal 
welfare standards see http://www.oie.int/animal-welfare/animal-welfare-key-themes/ 
accessed 1 July 2014.  Moreover it refers to an amicus curiae brief by Howse et al. which 
enunciates ‘the philosophy of "animal welfarism" and its connection to "a long 
established tradition of moral thought".’ Panel Reports EC – Seals, Footnotes 668 and 
672. 
37 Canada’s 2nd written submission, p.168. 
38 Norway’s answers to Panel Question 39. 
39 Panel Reports EC – Seals, Footnote 468. 
40 Ibidem, Footnote 469. 
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to link the reason for the differences in the treatment of seals to a general 
standard of the EU public’s morality (7.301). This meant that the ‘lack of 
even-handedness’ could not ‘cure’ the violations of national treatment and 
most-favoured nation (MFN) obligations. The Panel also found that its 
analysis of legitimate regulatory distinction under Art.2.1 of the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) was ‘relevant and 
applicable’ to its assessment of the requirements of the chapeau of Article 
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This finding 
was reversed by the AB. But there is no further argument on or reference 
to the existence of a mandatory international ‘moral standard’ possibly 
showing the detrimental impact of the EU regime to stem exclusively from 
the legitimate regulatory distinctions which have emerged as a standard 
test in the TBT triad (COOL, Cloves and Tuna). 
Before the AB the EU complained that ‘the Panel failed to recognise 
that the fundamental tenet of "animal welfarism" is precisely that it is 
morally acceptable to inflict suffering upon animals where sufficiently 
justified by human needs.’ Like it had done before the panel the EU 
motivated its ‘moral assessment’ by reference to the above-mentioned UN, 
ILO and OIE texts but did not take this link to PIL any further under 
Article 31 VCLT.41 In its view, international instruments are ‘evidence’ 
and not ‘instruments setting out legal obligations that would conflict with 
the WTO agreements.’42 
The Appellants again rejected this argument, saying ‘international 
agreements cited by the European Union before the Panel do not require 
the European Union to protect the interests of Inuit or other indigenous 
communities by discriminating against the products of non-indigenous 
peoples.’43 
The AB did not accept the Panel’s use of Article 2.1 TBT for an analy-
sis under GATT Article XX (5.310–5.314). In completing ‘to the extent 
possible’ the analysis under the chapeau of GATT Article XX it found the 
EU’s criteria for differentiating commercial hunts from those by indige-
nous communities ‘ambiguous’. The EU Seals Regime could thus ‘be 
applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail’ 
                                                 
41 Opening Oral Statement by the European Union, 17 March 2014, Geneva, pp.6&7. 
Cf. Other Appellant Submission by the European Union, 29 January 2014, Footnote 59 
with another, PIL-unrelated reference to VCLT. 
42 EU Appellee Submission, para. 90. 
43 AB Report EC – Seals, para 2.4. 
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(5.328). In plain English, the AB found that commercially hunted EU seals 
could still end up on the EU market. This led the AB to reject the public 
morals exception under the chapeau of GATT Article XX. The AB made 
no more references to possibly competing PIL and IEL. 
For seals it looks as if international agreements do not even serve to 
‘inform the analyses’ of WTO adjudicators, as happened in the three TBT 
cases.44 The matter is thus left to WTO historians – and as an easy target 
for criticism by animal welfare and human rights NGOs. Unless the AB 
gets a chance to review its own position, ‘evolutionary interpretation’ as 
posited by Marceau seems to have reached a limit.45 
Case Summary 
These then are the most frequent references to the Vienna Convention 
and to PIL. The general pattern is a confirmation of the adjudicators’ 
findings and reasoning which however remain almost exclusively based on 
WTO law. Additional examples could be quoted where the VCLT bypass 
also serves to fill gaps or clarify terms such as ‘circumstances’, ‘preparato-
ry work’, ‘including’, ‘confirm’ and others, as well as to ‘determine’ 
certain meanings by reference to the records of the negotiation.46 
In our analysis we proceed to examine the reasons for what looks like a 
conspicuous absence of recourse to substantive PIL in WTO dispute 
settlement. 
III. Analysis 
Perhaps the very advent of the WTO changed the parameters and the 
rules for policy-making even in fields that are only remotely trade-related 
such as the size and design of fishing nets. After a decade-long search for a 
more level playing field for international trade, negotiators thought they 
had plugged the last loopholes for discrimination. In particular, the SPS 
                                                 
44 AB Reports US – COOL, para. 271 (quoting AB Reports US – Cloves, para. 182 
and US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 215-216.). 
45 Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights. 13/4 (2002) EJIL 
753-814. 
46 Panel Report China – Intellectual Property Rights, para 7.260 and footnote 252 
(supplementary means of interpretation in accordance with Article 32 VCLT). The panel 
in China – Audiovisuals made no less than 38 references to Articles 31 and 32 VCLT in 
order to determine the meaning of ‘sound recording distribution services’ in China’s 
Schedule of concessions. 
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and TBT Agreements looked like foolproof prohibitions of all non-trade 
barriers (NTB) where any (unnecessary) trade restriction cannot even be 
rescued under one of the general exception clauses in GATT Article XX. 
This attempt was so successful that, except for a few sea turtles, even 
dolphins and menthol cigarettes were caught in the net cast by WTO to 
defend free trade. Very few slippages occurred. Growth hormones had to 
be bailed out with a murky beef quota reserved for the complainants, and 
the EU’s GMO moratorium remains before the DSB. But mandatory labels 
for informing consumers face a tough examination under discrimination 
complaints. Classic trade remedy cases such as aircraft and car subsidies 
come under policy space scrutiny unheard of in pre-WTO times. The next 
challenge to the system might well be a ruling of a violation of the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 
a law protecting publicity-enslaved cigarette smokers. 
This is the apparent success story of the WTO. ‘Apparent’ because, as 
we argue here, the fight against protectionism has only been successful at 
the price of splendid isolation. Moreover, it comes at the expense of policy 
space restrictions for otherwise legitimate non-trade objectives and for the 
protection of public goods. Seen from outside, the DSU increasingly 
appears like a system-inherent self-restraint. Even internationally agreed 
non-trade concerns appear as so many Trojan horses being ridden to defeat 
the multilateral trading system.47 Indeed, disputes where respondents 
invoke such concerns increasingly come to WTO adjudicators. The surpris-
ing feature is that all too often the complainants, and still less the adjudica-
tors, do not seem to want to recognise their PIL obligations as a basis for 
the multiplicity of policy objectives guiding the measures at issue. 
Very few substantive PIL (or non-WTO IEL) references squeeze 
through this WTO net of non-discrimination. Of course, there are the 
‘three sisters’ in SPS cases which are recognised under Article 3.4 SPS as 
the competent organisations for setting ‘default standards’ in all trade 
matters relating to human, animal and plant life and health. These are the 
only standard-setters recognised in a WTO agreement, apart from pream-
bular language and indicative lists. Dispute settlers are on safe ground 
                                                 
47 We borrow the term ‘non-trade concerns’ from Article 20 of the WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture: never defined in either the Uruguay or the Doha Rounds, or in any trade 
dispute, but often invoked like a mantra by trade diplomats trying to slow down 
agricultural trade liberalisation. ‘Rural development’, ‘food security’ and ‘financial 
needs’ might be viewed as terms with similar impacts for those who claim them for their 
own policy space while calling for more market access. 
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here, and this direct reference allows WTO not to become a ‘science 
court’.  
Furthermore, as shown in some of the above cases, there are abundant 
examples of PIL/IEL texts referred to in the submissions of litigating 
parties, both complainants and respondents: the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and 
the Biodiversity Convention (including the Cartagena Protocol), the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Convention, and many others. How do panels and the AB 
deal with such arguments? Cautiously, because typically the other party or 
parties would argue non-applicability in the case at hand or in general, 
invoking DSU ‘seclusion’. Nonetheless, as we have seen above, for in-
stance the AB in US – Shrimp and the panel in EC – Biotech carefully 
defined new approaches with a prudent and limited opening up to VCLT-
based treaty interpretation. 
There are no references to VCLT and PIL for interpreting public morals 
in the so far three WTO cases. Adjudicators did use the VCLT for inter-
preting other terms in those cases, but for ‘public morals’ they showed 
total deference to the parties. The lead case is US – Gambling where 
dictionary definitions were used to define public morals as ‘standards of 
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or 
nation.’48 That panel also referred to earlier AB findings when it agreed 
that ‘the content of these concepts for Members can vary in time and 
space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, 
cultural, ethical and religious values’ and that ‘Members, in applying 
similar societal concepts, have the right to determine the level of protec-
tion that they consider appropriate’ (para 6.461). 
We would argue that not even attempting to find internationally agreed 
language in respect of public morals is somewhat surprising, considering 
that trade rules are hardly sufficient to tackle situations where different 
cultural values lead to trade disputes. In China – Audiovisuals the respond-
ent made a reference to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Declaration on Cultural Diversity but 
not as a defence for its breaches of trading rights commitments under the 
                                                 
48 Panel report US – Gambling, para 6.465. Upheld in AB Report, para 299. 
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Accession Protocol.49 For its analysis of GATT Article XX(a) the Panel 
then adopted the deferential definition used in US – Gambling.50 
The seals case is another step backwards for a consideration of public 
morals by a VCLT-based reference to international treaties. The recogni-
tion of the right to invoke Art.XX(a) is seemingly a victory for the EU. 
But, regardless whether the EU can now solve the ‘ambiguity’ problem 
which led its public morals defense to fail, the rulings of the panel and of 
the AB are not based on the international standards for the rights of indig-
enous people or for animal welfare invoked by the EU. Purists will argue 
that there was no need, or that the respondent saw that such a direct re-
course would not help. The parties themselves seem to harbour doubts, or 
mixed feelings, as to the use of such standards in a trade dispute. Possible 
negative fallout in another case of interest to them, or the general reluc-
tance to introduce non-trade concerns into WTO dispute settlement might 
act as deterrents to more forceful arguments, with the VCLT as a bridge. In 
all such cases, adjudicators will clearly find it very difficult or impossible 
to go beyond the arguments put forward by the parties. Nevertheless, in 
our view a direct, VCLT-based recourse by the respondent and the adjudi-
cators to international human rights or rights of indigenous people, or to 
animal welfare standards, might have led to a different outcome precisely 
because the seal ban put the EU in a quandary between two at least partly 
conflicting policy objectives. 
Excessive prudence can exacerbate what Petersmann recently called the 
systemic problem of multilevel governance of international public goods . 
He argued that both PIL and IEL obligations can be ‘justified as necessary 
instruments for reforming international law for the benefit of citizens; the 
“consistent interpretation” – and “judicial comity” – requirements of 
national and international legal systems call for interpreting such agree-
ments in conformity with the UN and WTO legal obligations of contract-
ing parties as integral parts of multilevel governance of “aggregate PGs” 
demanded by citizens. Petersmann also reminds us that ‘WTO dispute 
settlement bodies continue neglecting that the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation and adjudication require interpreting treaties and settling 
related disputes not only on the basis of the text, context, objective and 
purpose of the applicable rules; as explicitly recalled in the Preamble and 
Article 31 VCLT, treaty interpretation and adjudication must also remain 
“in conformity with the principles of justice and international law”, includ-
ing “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (cf. Preamble and 
                                                 
49 Panel Report China – Audiovisuals, footnote 538. 
50 Ibid. para 7.759. 
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Article 31 VCLT), as confirmed in numerous UN legal instruments.’ 
Referring to Dworkin and Rawls, Petersmann concludes that ‘most WTO 
dispute settlement reports fail to balance private and public interests in 
terms of “principles of justice” and “human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all”, contrary to the customary methods of treaty interpretation.’ 
In his view the blame does not lie with the adjudicators but with the 
negotiators: ‘Diplomatic monopolization of intergovernmental rulemaking 
(eg in secretive GATT/WTO negotiations) without effective parliamentary 
and democratic control risks undermining general consumer welfare and 
human rights, which diplomats deliberately refrained from mentioning 
anywhere explicitly in GATT/WTO law.’51 
Is this the last word on PIL from the WTO? Perhaps not. There is no 
reason for adjudicators not to consider international customary law to find 
a valid basis on which to assess regulations with a public morals objective, 
especially where different morals may modify competitive conditions. The 
necessary ‘weighing and balancing’ of the restrictiveness of the measures 
on international trade would seem even more forcefully to warrant re-
course to PIL: the Panel in China – Audiovisuals had recognised (although 
without recourse to the VCLT) that ‘the protection of public morals ranks 
among the most important values or interests pursued by Members as a 
matter of public policy’.52 
IV. Conclusions 
WTO law must be read in conjunction with, and ‘not in clinical isola-
tion’, from other IEL and from PIL. At the same time we must bear in 
mind the admonition in the same Article 3.2 of the DSU that 
‘[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’. A review of 
the present recourse to the VCLT in the DSB is thus useful to describe the 
leeway for interpretation available to WTO adjudicators. We do this even 
though in EC – Seals neither the panel nor the Appellate Body refer to the 
VCLT. What matters in this enquiry are not so much the rules or the 
number of references to the VCLT – often at the instigation of respondents 
                                                 
51 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Establishment of a GATT Office of Legal Affairs  
and the Limits of ‘Public Reason’ in the GATT/WTO  Dispute Settlement System. 
European University Institute, Department of Law, EUI Working Paper LAW 2013/10, 
p.10-13. Electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346661 accessed 1 July 
2014. 
52 Panel Report China – Audiovisuals, para. 7.817 
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or even complainants – but the extent to which adjudicators have consid-
ered non-WTO law and international standards in their deliberations and 
rulings. 
Many cases now come before the WTO that concern measures taken at 
least partly in response to non-trade concerns. A case in point is the TBT 
triad but there are others. 
Automaticity – the brilliant solution found in the Uruguay Round to 
prevent non-compliance – seems to have turned into a problem for cases 
which should not find a WTO judge as long as they are not protectionist 
(which they often are). As a result of the automatic litigation process in the 
WTO, all cases brought to the DSB end with a legally binding ruling, 
never mind the intents and purposes of the incriminated measures. Security 
and predictability are definitely the winners. However, perhaps as an at 
least partial consequence of its inherent ‘export bias’, a successful WTO 
may increasingly come under attack. Non-trade rules have been neglected 
or rejected as defences. Public morals, for example, are strongly upheld – 
as long as they do not result in any sort of discrimination against foreign 
suppliers. 
Negotiations leading to policy space limitations by way of further trade 
liberalisation can easily hit the wall. The sorry state of the Doha Round is 
but one example. The same however goes for the acceptance by society at 
large of WTO rulings with a potential to reach beyond trade aspects. It will 
take a brave trading community to agree on new disciplines for freer trade. 
Moreover, the necessary support of ‘non-traders’ in the ensuing ratification 
process might also depend on truly holistic adjudicators. 
This answers, at least politically, the third question raised in this paper, 
namely whether WTO adjudicators as the gate-keepers of rules’ security 
should make full use of their margin of appreciation. Up to now, orthodoxy 
has often prevailed over contextual wisdom and a vision beyond trade 
distortions. This may be partly due to a DSU provision formally prohibit-
ing any rules development. But it could also be that panellists deliberately 
choose to stay on the safe side and adhere to the letter if not the spirit of 
WTO law. They perhaps also do so knowing that a more sovereign AB 
having the last word, absent a negotiated outcome, can take a broader 
view, albeit with an analysis limited to issues of law. 
For the time being this trend towards deference and self-restraint despite 
the VCLT obligations continues. This raises the question whether the EU 
actually wants to accept PIL as a mandatory standard guiding its indige-
nous rights and animal welfare policies. Also, neither Inuit nor seals have a 
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standing in WTO dispute settlement. Another matter for further considera-
tion? 
To sum up, while WTO dispute settlement as a whole can be said to be 
sailing on smoothly without any major blips or too many unsolved cases, 
this is not the same for a perhaps increasing number of individual cases. 
Ultimately, one could liken the EU’s problem in the seals case to a Russian 
doll, with trade restrictions (doll #1) justified by conflicting public morals 
of animal protection (doll #2) except for killings by a community (doll #3) 
whose survival requires trade distortions (doll #4). 
Under the DSU rules adjudicators are prevented from ‘making the case’ 
for the parties and thus cannot really look at PIL unless the litigating 
parties consider those international treaties as binding. Even so, the per-
ceptible differences between the different rulings examined here confirm, 
first, that there is room for manoeuvre in a critical path analysis and, 
second, that the WTO would do well to carefully brief and train panellists, 
and AB members, with a view to defining their margin of appreciation in 
due deference to national policy space. An alternative – adjudicators as 
part of the Secretariat – is definitely the worst option in this course of 
action towards more coherence in international treaty interpretation. 
The WTO must continue to distinguish protectionism from protection. 
In most cases it is clearly inappropriate to protect public morals and 
societal choices with ‘WTO-incompatible’ measures. All too often a 
hidden agenda drives measures found to be violating trade law. At the 
same time, adjudicators disregarding context and ruling out ‘not more than 
minimally’ trade-distorting measures might be overstepping their mandate 
where the underlying policy objective and the public good is of high 
societal value and cannot be attained otherwise than with a minimal trade 
distortion. To continue doing so because of the splendid isolation syn-
drome may well come back to paralyse trade rules development by those 
negotiators who successfully isolated WTO from non-trade concerns. 
